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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze a vertically di¤erentiated mixed duopoly in medical care services.
Pollution is the source of illness. The government has a dual role. It decides how much to
invest to reduce the pollution level and it may participate in the health market running a
public hospital. We nd that the presence of the public provider increases the average quality
of the service in the market and it reduces the rate of mortality. Furthermore, when the public
hospital o¤ers services with the highest quality, then this has positive spillovers on the quality
o¤ered by the private provider. Despite these positive welfare improving features, the mixed
duopoly in medical care goes along with a highest level of pollution. In the presence of an
increasing concern about the relationship between pollution and health, understanding the
role of public intervention appears crucial.
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1 Introduction
Outdoor pollution is a major cause of death and diseases worldwide. The health e¤ects range from
increased hospital admissions and emergency room visits, to increased risk of premature death.
An estimated 4.2 million premature deaths globally are linked to air pollution (WHO, 2018).
Furthermore, annual expenditures range from US$240 billion to US$630 billion or approximately
three to nine percent of global spending on health care in 2013 in USA (Preker et al, 2016).
Pollution is known as a causal factor for certain chronic diseases, especially cancer, cardiovascular
and respiratory diseases, that have durable detrimental impacts in terms of illness and disability.
According to Briggs (2003) about 8-9% of the total disease burden may be attributed to pollution
in developed countries.
In this paper, we examine the relation between pollution and health when the medical care
market is served by a private and a public provider. Each provider chooses endogenously the
quality of its service. Pollution is the main cause of the disease. Our aim is to analyze how the
presence of a public hospital a¤ects the choice of the government between the public investment
to reduce pollution and quality of the service in the public hospital. Quality is a key concern for
patients and policy-makers in health care markets. In this paper, quality of the hospital embodies
the quality of the service, the quality of the physicians, the use of modern technologies (OECD
2015), short waiting time, etc.
This issue has attracted not much attention in previous theoretical literature in environmental
economics that has especially focused on the market e¤ects of the taxation on greenhouse emission
and its best formulation as for instance the carbon tax. However, each year many countries
estimate the economic impact of pollution in terms of direct expenditure for treatments, loss of
productivity or other economic losses. In this paper, we consider these losses and the alternative
pollution reduction cost in terms of a welfare loss.
To capture some features of the medical care market as well as to focus on pollution as a factor
that negatively a¤ects health, we use a standard vertical di¤erentiated mixed duopoly model.
The government determines the amount of public investment that ghts pollution and it also
participates in running a public hospital. Many countries used to organize their health care sector
as a public service, but more recently many have introduced competition with the rationale of
increasing quality. The resulting structure of the market consists of public and private providers
that we represent using a mixed duopoly.1 The choice of a duopoly well suits the empirical evidence
that medical markets are very concentrated (Gaynor and Town, 2011). OECD projections show
that public spending on health and long-term care is on course to reach almost 9% of GDP in 2030
and as much as 14% of GDP by 2060 (OECD 2015).
The relationship between quality of medical care and hospital ownership (public vs private) is
mixed. For instance, Bjorvatn (2018) documents a shorter waiting time and shorter length of stay
in private hospitals. However, Tynkkynen and Vrangbæk (2018) through "a scoping review of hos-
pital services in Europe" show how many studies state a higher e¢ ciency and even a higher quality
of public hospitals with respect to private ones. Shaikh et al (2018) investigate the relationship
between social class and waiting time at health facilities nding that social status is positively
related to higher waiting time only if visiting a private facility; whereas in governmental medical
care the relationship between waiting time and social status is not signicant. In view of this di-
verging empirical results, we analyze the choice of quality between the private and public hospital
as endogenous. We consider a duopoly market under di¤erent scenarios: a private duopoly with
two prot maximizer providers and then a mixed duopoly with a public welfare maximizer and a
private prot maximizer. The two providers choose the price and the qualities of their service in a
1There are many di¤erent ways to access to the medical care services. In some countries like Italy, UK, Sweden
and Canada, the access to the medical care service is covered by the general taxation and the consumer has
to pay, at most, a low ticket. In many other countries (Germany, Luxembourg, Japan among others) there is a
mandatory public insurance that covers a percentage of the cost or the amount exceeding an annual deductible (like
in Netherlands). In Singapore the public insurance is optional, whereas in many american countries (USA or Latin
Americans) the State ensures the access to medical services to old or poor agents (or, sometimes, it is guaranteed
the access to basic services to the whole population), then private insurances cover the remaining services. China
is the country with the most interesting evolution in the management of the medical care service. Between 1949
and 1984, the communist government created a full public system in order to face the very high mortality in the
country. Starting from the 1984 there has been the transition to a free market conguration that created many
problems, because hospitals remained public, the nancing was greatly reduced and a great share of population had
no possibility to access to medical services. In the 2003 and 2008 a series of reforms tried to ensure basic services
to the whole population, leading to a medical care market similar to the common public system worldwide.
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two stage sequential game: in the rst stage they choose simultaneously the quality level, whereas
in the second, providers set prices.
From the seminal paper of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), the literature has given prominence
to mixed vertically di¤erentiated models, describing the e¤ects of the presence of a public rm.
Several aspects has been investigated: the existence of a rst-mover advantage both in the price
and the quality stage (Delbono et al 1996), the characterization of quality choice without an ex
ante assumption about the market coverage (Wauthy, 1996), the e¤ect on the timing for entry
(which results to always be simultaneous) if there is a public rm (Liu and Lu, 2014); the e¤ect
on welfare e¢ ciency (Grilo, 1994, Lutz and Pezzino, 2014); the e¤ect on di¤erent quality-cost
conguration (Motta, 1993); or the e¤ect of a partial privatization (Ishibashi and Kaneko, 2008).
In the present paper, for the rst time, this well-known setting is introduced in the health markets
in presence of pollution issues.
The main results of the paper are as follows. We nd that in the private duopoly conguration,
there is the lowest average quality provided. Crucially, in the private duopoly there is the highest
number of agents that remain uncured due to the high price of the medical care service. This makes
the private conguration the scenario with the lowest welfare level. Nonetheless, in a pure private
market conguration in medical care with the government only investing to reduce pollution, there
is the lowest level of pollution. Last, the mixed duopoly conguration with the public hospital
o¤ering the highest quality service is characterized by the lowest mortality rate.
Relevant related literature encompasses research on the e¤ect of pollution on health as well as
studies documenting competition and quality in medical care. Ebenstein et al (2015) show that air
pollution clearly a¤ects the cardiorespiratory mortality rate in China, one of the most polluted and
emerging economy in the world. Other works like Calderón-Garcidueñas et al (2014), Harris et al
(2016) or Brockmeyer and DAngiulli (2016) show how pollution can cause a neuroinammation
which leads to neural, behavioral and cognitive change.
There exist a relatively vast empirical literature about the e¤ect of competition in quality
choices of medical care providers. Propper et al (2008) testies improvements in quality of health
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care due to the introduction of competition elements. Gravelle et al (2014) empirically study
whether hospitals compete in quality, nding that hospitals quality is positively associated with
the quality of its rivals. This result suggests that any policy which increases the quality in one
hospital will have positive e¤ects on the level of quality in other providers. Tay (2003) uses very
detailed individual data to rstly characterize the demand function in health markets and then to
emphasize the importance of quality di¤erentiation of hospital in a spatially di¤erentiated market.
It appears that geographic market concentration is an inappropriate measure of hospital compet-
itiveness. Gutacker et al (2016) analyses the relationship between hospital quality competition
and the quality aspects that determine the choice of hospital. Using UK data, authors show that
it is the health gain dimension of the quality that explains the demand for medical care. In this
paper, using a well-established theoretical model in industrial organisation, we bring together the
governmental decision on how much to invest in environmental actions that reduce pollutions
negative e¤ects on health as well as competition in quality and prices in health markets.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 assumptions of the model are stated. In
Section 3 and 4 private and mixed duopoly are analyzed, respectively. In Section 5 the optimal
pollution level is analyzed. In Section 6, rather than focusing on the level of welfare in each
market conguration, we use the mortality rate as the comparison criteria between scenarios.
Some conclusions are underscored in Section 7.
2 The Model
Agents and Pollution. Consider a country with a heterogeneous population whose numerosity is
normalized to 1. The heterogeneity is due to a di¤erent willingness to pay si, uniformly distributed
over [0; 1], for the purchase of the medical care service.
Agents living in this country may get a disease with probability q. We assume that the disease
is transversal and it shows randomly among the population regardless of the agentswillingness
to pay. This implies that the distribution of the willingness to pay is the same among sick agents
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and the whole population.2 Hence, a share q of every willingness to pay gets sick as illustrated in
the picture below:
q
0 1
L H
Figure 1: The total population is normalized to one, whereas the share of the population that
obtains the disease (in dark grey) is equal to q:
Medical care service. The medical care service can have two di¤erent quality levels L; H 2
[0; 1] (with L < H). The high and the low quality demand functions are, respectively, qH and
qL:
qH = q(1  iH) = q(1  pH   pL
H   L ) and qL = q(iH   iL) = q
LpH   HpL
L(H   L) (1)
and they are determined by the two indi¤erent consumers iH and iL:
iH =
pH   pL
H   L and iL =
pL
L
.
The unserved market, i.e. the portion of the market composed by agents who want to buy the
service but have a willingness to pay too low even for the low quality service is denoted by u.
Therefore the total number of sick agents q is the sum of the number of agents served by the
two providers plus the unserved market u:
q = qH + qL + u:
Agents utility. Agents have a utility function that depends on the state of health and the
state of illness. The rst state gives a utility level denoted by si. Each sick agent has a level of
2By this assumption, we are excluding the case in which agents who get sick are predominantly "rich" or "poor"
(in terms of willingness to pay). For instance, think of the pollution produced by a coal power plant which may
pollute for kilometres, an area large enough to reach poor and rich agents.
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utility jsi net of the price for the required medical care service.3 Hence, the utility function of
the generic agent i is:
Ui(si; q; pj; j) =
8<:
si if healthy
jsi   pj if sick and hospitalized
0 if sick and not hospitalized
; j = H;L; i 2 (0; 1) :
As expected, healthy agents have the highest utility,4sick agents that are not hospitalized have a
null utility (because they have to face the disease alone), and nally, sick and hospitalized agents
have a utility which depends on the quality and the price of the purchased service.
Hospitals. On the supply side, there are two providers. Firstly, we consider the private
duopoly (with two prot maximizer rms) and then, the mixed duopoly scenario with a public
welfare maximizer and a private prot maximizer. The two providers choose the price and the
quality of the service in a two-stage sequential game: in the rst stage, they choose the quality
level, whereas in the second, they set prices.
The two rms have the same technology and face a quadratic, quality dependent, cost function:
C(j) = k
2
jqj; k > 0: (2)
Pollution. The government has the possibility to reduce pollution by sustaining a cost that
depends on the severity of the pollution and on the endemic capability to withstand the disease
;  < q:5
P (q) = (q   )2 : (3)
Since both the number of sick agents and the pollution reduction cost are usually directly related
to the level of pollution, we assume that q is both the share of sick agents and the cost that
the government has to pay to reduce the pollution. The parameter  reduces the pollution cost,
3Although worldwide there are many di¤erent medical care service systems, most of the time based on a public
or private insurance market, we want to abstract from this wide range of systems by assuming a standard market
dynamics based on the payment of a market price.
4This assumption does not a¤ect the price and quality stages but it becomes relevant in the pre-stage, where
the government optimizes the pollution level.
5We can also see  as the easiness to maintain a low level of pollution (due to the strong immune system of the
population).
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because a high natural capability to withstand the disease reduces the relevance of pollutions
e¤ects. For example, if a population is resistant to a specic pollutant (for a natural condition),
that population may withstand a higher level of that specic pollutant with respect to other
populations. Finally, using the quadratic form allows to consider that it is (marginally) easier to
clean a slightly polluted site rather than a site polluted for a long period.
The government chooses the level of pollution/sickness q before the market competition of the
two rms (for this reason we call it a pre-stage). In this pre-stage, it maximizes the welfare taking
into account the pollution reduction cost P and the extra-welfare due to healthy agents. The
government chooses the optimal level of q that maximizes this augmented welfare function. This
second element is usually not take into account in a standard vertical di¤erentiation model.
3 Private duopoly
In this section, we analyze the case of two private prot maximizing providers. In this scenario,
the role of the government consists only of the regulation of the pollution level. This ultimately
means that the governments selects the share q of agents that will get ill. We solve the model
backwards.
The objective function of the private rm is to maximize prots j :
Max
pj ;j
j = pjqj   k2jqj: (4)
Under symmetry, there are two possible specular equilibria. In each one there is a rm that chooses
high quality (H) and a rm that chooses low quality (L). From (1), (2) and (4), the resulting
prot functions are:
H(pH ; pL; H ; L) = (pH   k2H)(1  pH pLH L )q
L(pH ; pL; H ; L) = (pL   k2L) LpH HpLL(H L) q:
(5)
Solving the price stage, and being the concavity conditions satised, prices as functions of the
quality obtains as:
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pH (H ; L) =
H (2H (1 + kH) + (kL   2) L)
4H   L
pL (H ; L) =
L (H   L + kH (H + 2kL))
4H   L
and the prot functions with respect to qualities become:
H(H ; L) = q
2
H
H   L
(L   4H)2
(2  2kH   kL)2
L(H ; L) = qHL
H   L
(L   4H)2
(kL   kH   1)2 :
Solving the quality stage, and being the concavity conditions satised, we nd the following
equilibrium qualities and equilibrium prices:
H =
0:40972
k
and pH =
0:22662
k
L =
0:19936
k
and pL =
7:5006 10 2
k
:
The prots for each rm as function of the number of sick agents is:
H =
1:6407 10 2
k
q and L =
1:2147 10 2
k
q.
The corresponding market shares are for the high quality service qH , for the low quality service
qL, and the uncovered market u, i.e. the share of sick agents that are not hospitalized are:
qH = 0:27926q; q

L = 0:3445q; u = 0:37624q:
Finally, the average reservation prices for high and low quality consumers are s = 0:54848 and
s^ = 0:86037, respectively. In this Scenario, the average quality P weighted for the market shares
is P = 0:183
k
q.
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4 Mixed duopoly
Now we study the setting in which one of the two rms has a public owner and maximizes the
welfare instead of its prot. In this situation, it is not indi¤erent which rm o¤ers the low quality
service and which one o¤ers the high quality one. Thus, we consider two di¤erent scenarios. In
Scenario A, the public rm o¤ers the low quality service and the private rm o¤ers the high
quality one. In Scenario B, the opposite occurs.
We will distinguish the public and the private rm for their objective function, W for the
public hospital and  for the private one, respectively. The low/high quality choice is indicated
by the subscript L and H, respectively.
4.1 Scenario A: the public rm o¤ers the low quality service
The private rm has the same objective function as in the private duopoly case, namely:
Max
pH ;H
H(pH ; pL; H ; L) = (pH   k2H)

1  pH   pL
H   L

q
whereas the objective function of the public rm is:
Max
pL;L
WL(pH ; pL; H ; L) = (Ls  pL) qL+ (H s^  pH) qH
+
 
pL   k2L

qL+
 
pH   k2H

qH : (6)
In the latter equation, the rst two addends are the consumer surpluses for those who buy from
the public and the private rm respectively; whereas (pL   kL) qL is the public rms prot, and
nally (pH   kH) qH is the private rms prot.
Since the willingness to pay is uniformly distributed in the unit interval, s and s^ are the average
willingness to pay of agents who buy the low quality and those who buy the high quality service,
respectively.6
6In the pre-stage analysis we will include, in the formulation of welfare, the share (1 q) of individuals that have
no diseases and have the average willingness to pay ~s, which is the mean of all agents (due to the initial assumption
that they are randomly extract from the whole distribution). In this stage this additional addend is irrelevant,
because it has no relevant variables for the price and the quality stage.
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The above mentioned average willingness to pay are:
~s =
1
2
s =
iH + iL
2
=
LpH + pL(H   2L)
2L(H   L) (7)
s^ =
1 + iH
2
=
H   L + pH   pL
2(H   L) :
Therefore, using (1) and (2), (6) we can rewrite WL. Proceeding as usual by backward induction,
we solve the price stage and it turns out the following equilibrium prices (in terms of qualities)
are:
pH (H ; L) =
H
 
H   L + k
 
2H + 
2
L   HL

2H   L
pL (H ; L) =
L (H   L + kH(2L   H))
2H   L :
Using these expressions for prices, we rewrite the objective function that each rm maximizes
to select the optimal level of quality to provide. Being the concavity conditions satised, the
equilibrium qualities are:
H =
0:37995
k
and L =
0:25882
k
:
Then, the optimal prices obtains as:
pH =
0:17754
k
and pL =
8:9589 10 2
k
:
Therefore, the optimal level of welfare and the prot of the private rm are:
H =
9:0878 10 3
k
q and W L =
7:7545 10 2
k
q.
The corresponding market shares for the Scenario A, for the high quality service, for the low
quality service, and the uncovered market, are:
qH = 0:27391q; q

L = 0:37994q; u = 0:34615q:
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Finally, the average willingness to pay for high and low quality consumers are s = 0:53612 and
s^ = 0:86304, respectively. In this Scenario, the average quality (weighted for the market shares)
is Ga = 0:202
k
q.
Comparing the outcome of Scenario A with the outcome in the private duopoly we nd that,
Proposition 1 In a vertically di¤erentiated mixed duopoly, if the private rm is the high quality
service provider and the public rm is the low quality service provider, the average quality provided
is higher than the corresponding one under private duopoly.
4.2 Scenario B: the public rm o¤ers the high quality service
In this alternative Scenario, the private rm o¤ers the low quality service, whereas the public
one provides the high quality service. The objective functions are the following:
Max
pL;L
L(pH ; pL; H ; L) = (pL   k2L) LpH HpLL(H L) q
Max
pH ;H
WH(pH ; pL; H ; L) = qL (Ls  pL) +qH (H s^  pH)
+
 
pL   k2L

qL+
 
pH   k2H

qH :
Then we have the same formulation for average willingness to pay levels s, s^ and ~s as for the
Scenario A (see 7).
By solving the price stage, the optimal prices as functions of the level of qualities are:
pH (L; H) =
kH
 
22H   2L

2H   L and pL (L; H) =
kL
 
2H   2L + HL

2H   L :
Given these expressions for prices, solving the FOC system, and being the concavity conditions
satised, the equilibrium qualities are:
H =
0:389 83
k
and L =
0:259 89
k
yielding the following optimal prices
pH =
0:17730
k
and pL =
9:2871 10 2
k
:
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Finally, we obtain the optimal level of welfare and prot as:
W H =
7:7916 10 2
k
q and L =
7:405 2 10 3
k
q:
For the Scenario B, the corresponding market shares for the high quality service, for the low
quality service, and the uncovered market are
qH = 0:35025q; q

L = 0:29241q; u = 0:35734q:
The average willingness to pay for high and low quality consumers are s = 0:50355 and s^ =
0:82488, respectively. In this Scenario, the average quality, weighted for the market shares), is

Gb
= 0:213
k
q.
Proposition 2 In a vertically di¤erentiated mixed duopoly, if the public rm is the high quality
service provider, the average quality is the highest as compared with Scenario A and the private
duopoly. Both qualities are the highest than in any other scenario.
4.3 Quality choice
Since W H > W

L and 

H > 

L 8q; k, we can conclude that there is a clear advantage to choose
the high quality for both rms. As in Delbono et al (1996), there are two subgame perfect Nash
equilibria. Furthermore, in each of the two mixed scenarios the private prot is lower than any
prot in the pure private duopoly, whereas the welfare is higher. The result is that the private
rm prefers to compete in a private duopoly (o¤ering the high quality service) and the public rm
prefers to compete in the Scenario B of the mixed duopoly (o¤ering the high quality service).
Since there is not a unique equilibrium, we compute the optimal pollution level for each case,
leaving the comparative analysis for the end.
5 Pre-stage: Optimal choice of pollution level
In this section, we examine the pre-stage of the game in the three di¤erent market congurations.
In this pre-stage, the government chooses the optimal pollution level.
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We will indicate the private duopoly with the apex P and the mixed duopoly with the apex Ga
for the Scenario A, and the apex Gb for the Scenario B. The government maximizes the welfare
with respect to q. We argue that the pollution reducing investment, and thus the percentage of
the number of agents that have the disease, is a costly process for the government. As we have
assumed in the model setting section with (3), the cost function P (q) is convex with respect to
q: the higher the number of potential sick agents, the higher the cost to be sustained (assuming
that a high number of sick agents is implied by a high level of pollution). In other words, the
higher the level of pollution, the higher the cost to reduce the pollution. To compute the optimal
level, the government maximizes the augmented welfare, which considers the number of healthy
agents 1
2
(1   qr) and subtracts the pollution reduction cost (qr   )2, r = P;Ga;Gb. Recall that
the parameter  is the specic endurance of the population to the pollution and it allows us to
adapt the pollution reduction cost function to the specicity of each population.
In the private duopoly model, given the equilibrium values of the price-quality optimization,
the government maximizes the following augmented welfare function with respect to qP :
W P =
1
2
(1  qP ) + 7:5541 10
 2
k
qP    qP   2
and the resulting optimal pollution level in the pure private duopoly model is:
qP =  2:7411 10
 7
k
 
9:1206 105k   3:648 2 106k  1:378 105 :
In the Scenario A of the mixed duopoly model, the government maximizes the following aug-
mented welfare function with respect to qGa:
WGaL =
1
2
(1  qGa) + 7:7545 10
 2
k
qGa    qGa   2
that leads to the optimal pollution level in the mixed duopoly model (with the public rm which
o¤ers the low quality service):
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qGa =  2:5 10
 6
k
 
105k   4:0 105k  15509 :
Finally, in Scenario B of the mixed duopoly and given the equilibrium values of the price-quality
optimization, the government maximizes the following augmented welfare function with respect
to qGb:
WGbH =
1
2
(1  qGb) + 7:7916 10
 2
k
qGb    qGb   2
and the resulting optimal pollution level in the mixed duopoly model (with the public rm which
o¤ers the high quality service) is:
qGb =
2:0 10 6
k
  1:25 105k + 5:0 105k + 19479 :
We are now in condition to establish the size of the uncovered market, the level of welfare at the
optimal level of pollution in the two possible outcomes of the strategic interaction Scenario A and
Scenario B. By Propositions 1, 2 and 3, we observe that in the private duopoly conguration,
there is the highest high quality services and the lowest low quality services provided, leading to
the widest spread between two qualities. Furthermore, in the private duopoly there is the highest
unserved share market. Hence, despite the lowest low quality, the corresponding price is not so
low and there are more agents with a willingness to pay lower than the required price.
Proposition 3 In the private duopoly model there is the highest unserved share of the market.
In the private duopoly model the welfare is lower than in the two mixed cases. This is the
well known result, in the literature, that the high quality good gives a premium both in terms of
prot or welfare. For this reason both the private and the public rm have the incentive to choose
high quality. Therefore, as far as the welfare is concerned, the mixed duopoly with the public
rm which o¤ers the high quality service is the market conguration which leads to the highest
welfare.
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Proposition 4 In a private duopoly there is the lowest welfare.
Finally, by comparing the optimal pollution level in the three analyzed cases, it holds qP <
qGa < qGb 8 (see Figure 2). Hence,
Proposition 5 In a private duopoly conguration in medical care and a government that inter-
venes only to invest in pollution reduction, there is the lowest level of pollution.
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qP, qGa, qGb
Optimal pollution level (or number of sick agents) with respect to parameter  in the public
(Scenario A: green line; Scenario B: red line) and private (black line) duopoly.
To conclude, the presence of the public rm in the medical market improves quality and, as
an indirect consequence, makes less convenient the reduction of the amount of pollution (for a
given parameter ). In other words, the chance to directly take care of sick agents reduces the
convenience on spending on a lower pollution level. Hence, in a vertically di¤erentiated medical
care service model where the government has the possibility to choose the level of pollution, the
optimal solution in terms of welfare is a mixed duopoly with the public rm that o¤ers the high
quality service. This is nevertheless not the most environmentally friendly market conguration.
6 An alternative evaluation
Health markets are, by denition, a very sensible topic because the traded "good" in the market is
the health of agents. The quality of the service a¤ects the probability of successfully treating the
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disease, hence, the quality a¤ects not only the consumers satisfaction but also the mortality rate.
The mortality rate cannot be seen as a measure of quality of service per se, but as an outcome
dened by the quality of the service (Gaynor and Town, 2011). Hospitals are thus not choosing
mortality rates, but rather a quality of service level that has an impact on mortality. Accordingly,
welfare is not the only measure to consider to evaluate market conguration. It could be relevant
to investigate the number of agents that would perish due to the disease, given the choice of quality
and prices.
Under the assumption that quality a¤ects the risk to perish, then the unserved agents face
the highest risk. For this reason, in the following, we assume a mortality function that depends
negatively on the quality of the service but it is positively a¤ected by a parameter of quality
e¤ectiveness  2 R. The e¤ectiveness considers how much quality really a¤ects the mortality rate.
For example, there are some rare diseases for which it is possible to use only palliative care. In
those cases, the quality does not matter so much and its e¤ectiveness is low.
The resulting mortality rate Dr is multiplied by the respective number of agents who buy the
specic service:
Dr =
X
j=L;H;u
h
qrj
 
1  rj
i
;
where j indicates the purchased quality, r indicates the market conguration. The unserved agents
receive a quality u that is equalized to 0.
For simplicity set k =  = 1. It is easy to verify that the number of perished agents DP in the
private duopoly is:
DP = qPH
 
1   PH + qPL  1   PL + uP = 0:21999 0:59028 + 0:27139 0:80064 + 0:29639:
The number of perished agents DGa in the mixed duopoly (Scenario A) is:
DGa = qGaH
 
1   GaH +qGaL  1   GaL +uGa = 0:216050:62005+0:299690:74118+0:27303:
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Finally, the number of perished agents DGb in the mixed duopoly (Scenario B) is:
DGb = qGbH
 
1   GbH +qGbL  1   GbL +uGb = 0:276330:61017+0:23070:74011+0:28193:
In Figure 3, we represent the number of perished agents in each market conguration. The
graph shows that the mortality rate is the lowest in private duopoly if  < 0:04054. By contrast,
if  > 0:04054; then the mortality rate is the lowest in Scenario B.
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Number of perished agents as a function of the quality e¤ectiveness rate  in the public (Scenario
A: green line; Scenario B: red line) and private (black line) duopoly.
The result yields from the higher pollution level allowed in the mixed model - which leads
to a higher number of sick agents - and the higher average quality (even considering the lower
unserved market share) - which reduces the probability to perish. Hence, the mortality rate is
lower in the private model only if the quality e¤ectiveness is very low, because in that case the
number of sick agents would be more relevant than the average quality o¤ered.
Finally, by considering that in the advanced economies the medical care service quality strongly
matters, we can conclude that:
Conclusion 6 In a vertically di¤erentiated model of medical care where the government has the
possibility to choose the level of pollution, the mixed duopoly (with the public rm o¤ering the high
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quality service) is the preferred market conguration not only in terms of welfare but also in terms
of the number of agents that may perish.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed a duopoly model in the medical care service market, by considering
environmental pollution as the sole reason for illness. In the model, the government has the
possibility to reduce the pollution level paying a cost that is increasing in the pollution level and
decreasing in the natural capability of agents to resist to diseases. The pollution level a¤ects
directly the number of agents who get sick. We have analyzed the case of a private duopoly and
the case of a mixed one, comparing results. Therefore, we have analyzed the double chance, by
the government, to set the optimal pollution level and to have or not a public rm in the market.
We nd that the presence of the public rm makes the government to accept a higher pollution
level that implies a higher number of sick agents with respect to the private duopoly model.
However, the public rm also guarantees a lower unserved market share, a higher quality spread
and a higher average quality(both in the case where it o¤ers the high and the low quality service).
Since the medical care service is a market with specic features because it regards the life of
agents and not only their consumption choices, we have also adopted a di¤erent approach in order
to evaluate the scenario with the lowest number of agents who have some clinical complications
or perish. To do this, we have assumed that the quality level a¤ects the mortality rate depending
on the degree of the quality e¤ectiveness to ght the illness. By doing so we try to mitigate the
resulting trade o¤ between the high pollution level in the mixed duopoly and the low average
quality in the private one. The result is that the private duopoly becomes preferred to the mixed
one if only if the quality e¤ectiveness is very low.
In both evaluations, for a level of quality e¤ectiveness that is not very low, the preferred
scenario is the mixed duopoly with the public rm o¤ering the high quality service and the private
rm o¤ers the low one.
To conclude, the mixed duopoly with the public rm o¤ering the high quality service is the
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market conguration which implies not only the highest welfare level, but also the lowest risk of
perishing for sick agents, except for cases of a very low quality e¤ectiveness of the medical care
service, like for very common diseases or, probably, in developing countries.
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8 Appendices
8.1 Appendix 1. Conditions for concavity in the quality stage in the
private duopoly
The SOC of the high quality rm requires:
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@2H
@2H
=  2q 20H2L+43L+17k2H4L+48k2H2L 44kH3L+160k24HL 128k3HL 40k23H2L 192k25H+k25L+128k4H 4k4L
(L 4H)4 < 0
whereas the SOC of the low quality rm is satised if:
@2L
@2L
=  2qH 96k
22H
2
L+7HL+40k
24H+48k
3
H+k
24L+8
2
H 121k23HL 16k2H3L 66k2HL
(L 4H)4 < 0:
Since the equilibrium qualities are
H =
0:40972
k
and L =
0:19936
k
the SOCs are locally satised as
@2H
 
H =
0:40972
k
; L =
0:19936
k

@2H
=  0:449 kq < 0
@2L
 
H =
0:40972
k
; L =
0:19936
k

@2L
=  0:585 kq < 0
since k and q are positive.
8.2 Appendix B. The concavity conditions in the quality stage in Sce-
nario A
The SOC of the private rm, which o¤ers the high quality good, requires:
@2H
@2H
=  2 q
(L 2H)4
  12k25H + 16k24HL   2k23H2L   6k22H3L + 7k2H4L + k25L+
+8k4H   16k3HL + 12k2H2L   8kH3L   2k4L + H2L + 3L

< 0
The SOC of the public rm, which o¤ers the low quality good, is satised if:
@2WL
@2L
=  q H
(L 2H)4

11k24H   40k23HL + 48k22H2L   16k2H3L + 2k24L + 10k3H
 14k2HL   2H + 2HL

< 0
For the given equilibrium qualities
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H =
0:37995
k
and L =
0:25882
k
the SOCs are locally satised as
@2H
 
H =
0:37995
k
; L =
0:25882
k

@2H
=  0:595 kq < 0
@2WL
 
H =
0:37995
k
; L =
0:25882
k

@2L
=  0:644 kq < 0
since k and q are positive.
8.3 Appendix C. The concavity conditions in the quality stage in Sce-
nario B
The SOC of the private rm, which o¤ers the low quality good, requires:
@2L
@2L
=  6k2q4H L(L 2H)4 < 0
which is always veried, because q and L are positive.
The SOC of the public rm, which o¤ers the high quality good, is satised if:
@2WH
@2H
=  k q
(L 2H)4
  48k5H + 84k4HL + 324H   48k3H2L
 643HL + 6k2H3L + 482H2L + 3kH4L   16H3L + 24L

< 0
For the given equilibrium qualities
H =
0:389 83
k
and L =
0:259 89
k
the SOC of the welfare maximization is locally satised as
@2WH
 
H =
0:389 83
k
; L =
0:259 89
k

@2H
=  0:648 kq < 0
since k and q are positive.
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